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Abstract 
 
Parochial altruism – a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members and 
mistrust or hostility towards outgroup members – is a pervasive feature in human society and 
strongly shapes the enforcement of social norms. Since the uniqueness of human society 
critically depends on the enforcement of norms, the understanding of the neural circuitry of 
the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement is key, but unexplored. To fill 
this gap, we measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
while subjects had the opportunity to punish ingroup members and outgroup members for 
violating social norms. Findings revealed that subjects’ strong punishment of defecting 
outgroup members is associated with increased activity in a functionally connected network 
involved in sanction-related decisions (right orbitofrontal gyrus, right lateral prefrontal cortex, 
right dorsal caudatus). Moreover, the stronger the connectivity in this network, the more 
outgroup members are punished. In contrast, the much weaker punishment of ingroup 
members who committed the very same norm violation is associated with increased activity 
and connectivity in the mentalizing-network (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral 
temporo-parietal junction), as if subjects tried to understand or justify ingroup members’ 
behavior. Finally, connectivity analyses between the two networks suggest that the 
mentalizing-network modulates punishment by affecting the activity in the right orbitofrontal 
gyrus and right lateral prefrontal cortex, notably in the same areas showing enhanced activity 
and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punished defecting outgroup members. 
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Introduction 
The uniqueness of human society is critically dependent on the development, compliance, and 
enforcement of elementary social norms and the associated altruistic behavior (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a). For instance, humans are willing to punish 
violators of social norms even at substantial personal costs (Boyd, et al. 2003; Fehr and 
Gächter 2002; Henrich 2006). A key element of the enforcement of many social norms, such 
as food-sharing norms in hunter-gatherer societies (Hill 2002; Kaplan, et al. 2000), is that 
people punish norm violators not only for direct transgressions against the punisher himself 
(termed second-party punishment), but also for norm violations against others (termed third-
party punishment) (Bendor and Swistak 2001; Sober and Wilson 1998). Norm enforcement 
requires that even third parties – who are neither economically, physically, nor 
psychologically affected by the violations – be willing to punish (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004b; Henrich, et al. 2006). Thus, third-party punishment greatly enhances the scope for 
norms that regulate human behavior. In fact, some researchers view the existence of third-
party sanctions as the decisive factor for the enforcement of social norms in human society 
because second-party punishment strategies are not evolutionarily stable, while strategies 
involving third-party sanctions are stable (Bendor and Swistak 2001).   
 
Experimental evidence from laboratory (Brewer 1979; Chen and Li 2009; Kinzler, et al. 2007; 
Koopmans and Rebers 2009; Tajfel, et al. 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979) and field studies 
(Bernhard, et al. 2006; Fehr, et al. 2008; Goette, et al. 2006) demonstrates that parochial 
altruism strongly shapes the compliance and enforcement of social norms. Parochial altruism 
constitutes a persuasive psychological phenomenon which is qualified by a preference for 
altruistic behavior towards the members of one’s ethnic, racial, or any other social group, 
combined with a tendency for indifference, mistrust, or even hostility toward outgroup 
members (Brewer 1999; Hewstone, et al. 2002). For example, a recent third-party punishment 
experiment in Papua New Guinea revealed strong favoritism toward a subject’s own linguistic 
group in giving to others, and significantly greater punishment of individuals from another 
linguistic group (in comparison to those from the subject’s own group) who committed a 
norm violation toward the subject’s ingroup members (Bernhard, et al. 2006). The importance 
of parochial altruism for the understanding of human society is corroborated by recent 
theoretical and experimental research that has closely tied outgroup hostility to the evolution 
of human prosociality within groups (Boyd, et al. 2003; Choi and Bowles 2007) and 
prosociality within groups (ingroup favoritism) to the evolution of cultural groups (Efferson, 
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et al. 2008).     
 
In view of the importance of third-party punishment for the enforcement of social norms, its 
parochial and altruistic nature, and the evidence for the co-evolution of parochialism, 
altruism, and cultural groups, we conjecture that humans have developed elaborate neural 
mechanisms for social cognition that modulate third-parties’ norm enforcement behavior 
dependent on the group affiliation of the norm violator and his or her victim. Although recent 
studies have fundamentally improved our knowledge of how the brain modulates norm 
compliance (Baumgartner, et al. 2009; Baumgartner, et al. 2008; Delgado, et al. 2005; 
Harbaugh, et al. 2007; King-Casas, et al. 2005; Rilling, et al. 2002; Spitzer, et al. 2007) and 
norm enforcement (Buckholtz, et al. 2008; de Quervain, et al. 2004; Fehr and Camerer 2007; 
Knoch, et al. 2007; Knoch, et al. 2006; Rangel, et al. 2008; Sanfey 2007; Sanfey, et al. 2003; 
Strobel, et al. 2011) they do not examine the parochial nature of this phenomena. There is also 
an important literature examining the neural circuitry of the cognitions involved in the 
evaluation of faces from distinct races (Cunningham, et al. 2004; Golby, et al. 2001; Phelps, 
et al. 2000), the judgment of people belonging to other races (Eberhardt 2005; Freeman, et al. 
; Ito and Bartholow 2009; Lieberman, et al. 2005; Richeson, et al. 2003), prejudice (Beer, et 
al. 2008) the evaluation of very poor and “disgusting” outgroups such as addicts and beggars 
in dirty clothes (Harris and Fiske 2006), and the general evaluation of ingroup-outgroup 
interactions (Mathur, et al. ; Van Bavel, et al. 2008) but none of the individuals in these 
studies had to make costly punishment decisions that involved real costs and benefits for 
themselves or for others. In these studies there was thus not trade off between the individual 
punishers’ self-interest, which suggests that he should not punish at all, and the punishers’ 
altruistic concerns, which suggest that he should protect the victim of norm violations. It is 
exactly this willingness to incur the cost of altruistic norm enforcement which renders 
altruistic third party punishment a powerful evolutionary force ((Bendor and Swistak 2001; 
Sober and Wilson 1998).  
 
By using a third-party punishment paradigm (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004b) with manipulation 
of group membership (in-/outgroup) (Bernhard, et al. 2006; Goette, et al. 2006), the 
involvement of real monetary stakes, and the requirement to curb immediate self-interests in 
order to enforce a social norm, the present study is the first to uncover the neural circuitry of 
parochial altruism and its impact on the enforcement of social norms. For that purpose, we 
exploited the fact that individuals are randomly assigned to real social groups (platoons) 
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during a four-week phase of officer training in the Swiss Army. During this training course, 
officer candidates interact almost exclusively with members of their own platoon and social 
ties within the platoon form very quickly (for details see method section). The applied third-
party punishment paradigm consists of two decision stages – one conducted during the third 
or fourth week of the training course and one conducted in the functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) scanner immediately after the end of the training course (within 5 days). All 
interactions were anonymous and one-shot. 
 
During the first decision stage, the officer candidates played a simultaneous Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game (PDG). Two players A and B were each endowed with 20 points each and 
had to decide simultaneously whether to keep the points or pass all of them to the other 
player. Passed points were doubled. Thus, keeping the points equals defection (denoted as D 
throughout the paper) and passing the points equals cooperation (denoted as C throughout the 
paper). For example, if A retained the 20 points while B transferred the 20 points (behavioral 
pattern DC), then A earned a total of 60 points (40 points from the transfer and plus the 
original 20 points) and B earned nothing. Thus, irrespective of what the other player did, a 
player in the first-stage was always better off if he kept the endowment for himself, but if both 
players kept their endowments they only earned 20 points each (behavioral pattern DD), 
whereas if they both cooperated and transferred their endowments, each earned 40 points 
(behavioral pattern CC).   
 
During the second decision stage, some of the officer candidates (16 subjects) were invited to 
the fMRI scanner and received the opportunity, in the role of a third-party (player C), to 
punish player A’s or player B’s behavior by assigning punishment points. For that purpose, 
player C received an endowment of 10 points at the beginning of each punishment trial (30 
trials in total, in each of which player C faced the previous decisions of different players A 
and B), which C could use to finance the assignment of punishment points. Assigning 1 
punishment point cost player C 1 point and cost the sanctioned player 3 points. Importantly, 
player C only could punish the behavior of one player (either A or B) during each of the  
played punishment trials. In order to simplify the nomenclature, we recoded all player C's 
decisions in such a way that A always refers to the player that C can punish, while B always 
refers to the player that C cannot punish. Please note that all players (players A, B, and C) 
were paid according to their decisions and those of their interaction partners. Thus, no 
deception of the subjects occurred in this study.    
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As we wanted to examine the neural circuitry of parochial altruism, third-parties in the fMRI 
scanner were confronted with the following three group constellations: (1) All three players in 
the game are from the same platoon (group constellation ABC, depicted in green color 
throughout the paper). (2) Only players A and C are from the same platoon, while player B is 
an outgroup member (group constellation AC, depicted in blue color throughout the paper). 
(3) Only players B and C are from the same platoon, while player A is an outgroup member 
(group constellation BC, depicted in red color throughout the paper). Because player C (the 
third-party) and player A (who can be punished, see above) are from the same group in the 
group constellations ABC and AC, we will in the following refer to these two group 
constellations as in-group constellations. In contrast, we will refer to the group constellation 
BC as out-group constellation because here player C (the third-party) and player A (who can 
be punished, see above) are from different groups. Please see Fig. 1 for a summary of the 
design and an example of a decision screen the third-parties saw during the scanning session.   
 
Based on the discussed behavioral literature (Bernhard, et al. 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004b; Goette, et al. 2006), we expect third-parties to show a parochial punishment pattern, 
qualified by a particular strong impact of group membership on punishment decisions in the 
DC condition, when player A defects and player B cooperates. In detail, we hypothesize that 
outgroup members who defect against cooperating ingroup members are punished much more 
severely than ingroup members who commit the same norm violation – a hypothesis the 
behavioral analyses strongly confirm (see results section for details). The key question this 
study therefore allows to answer is which brain circuits modulate this highly distinctive 
parochial punishment pattern.   
  
Recent neuroimaging studies on second-party norm enforcement suggest that two brain 
regions in particular play a decisive and functionally distinctive role in punishment-related 
decision processes; these are the right lateral PFC (Knoch, et al. 2007; Knoch, et al. 2006; 
Sanfey, et al. 2003) and the dorsal caudatus (de Quervain, et al. 2004; Seymour, et al. 2007). 
Evidence from transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Knoch, et al. 2006; van 't Wout, et 
al. 2005) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (Knoch, et al. 2007) studies 
suggests that the right lateral PFC is causally involved in (costly) norm enforcement behavior 
by modulating the weight of self-interest in the decision process. On the other hand, 
punishment-related activity in the dorsal caudatus [a brain region strongly implicated in the 
processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions (Fliessbach, et al. 2007; 
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Kawagoe, et al. 1998; O'Doherty, et al. 2004; Schultz and Romo 1988)] in combination with 
behavioral and questionnaire measures suggests that people derive satisfaction from punishing 
norm violators (de Quervain, et al. 2004; Singer, et al. 2006). We expect similar processes and 
associated brain activity patterns in the right lateral PFC and the dorsal caudatus when third-
parties strongly punish outgroup members (for defecting against cooperating ingroup 
members). Similar to second-parties, third-parties in our paradigm also have to modulate the 
weight of self-interest in the punishment decision – a decision process which activity in the 
dorsal caudatus might also reinforce and motivate.        
 
In addition to similar processes assumed to be necessary for the implementation of both 
second- and third-party punishment behaviors, we expect that the parochial nature of altruistic 
norm enforcement requires further psychological and cognitive processes and associated brain 
activity patterns, as the very same norm violation incurs much more severe punishment when 
an outgroup member is the perpetrator. We assume that at least two additional key processes 
must take place in the third-party brain in order to mediate such a highly distinctive 
punishment behavior. 
 
First, we expect the very same norm violation to be evaluated differentially dependent on the 
norm violator's group affiliation, that is more negatively when an outgroup member is the 
norm violator and/or more positively when an ingroup member commits the very same norm 
violation. If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect a differential activity pattern in those 
regions of the brain strongly associated with a decision-relevant reflective evaluation process, 
including in particular ventral and lateral regions of the orbitofrontal gyrus (OFG) (Hare, et al. 
2009; Kringelbach 2005; Liu, et al. 2007; Plassmann, et al. 2007; Rangel, et al. 2008). More 
precisely, there is some evidence for a medial-lateral distinction in the OFG, such that activity 
in medial areas is related to positive evaluation processes, while activity in lateral areas is 
related to negative evaluation processes (Kringelbach 2005; Liu, et al. 2007; Rilling, et al. 
2007; Spitzer, et al. 2007). We thus hypothesize that the increased negative evaluation of 
outgroup members’ norm violations might be associated with increased activity in lateral 
areas of the OFG. 
  
Second, we expect this group-dependent evaluation process and associated highly distinctive 
punishment pattern to be associated with a mentalizing process that attempts to justify these 
highly distinctive punishment decisions. In particular, we assume that a process must be 
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executed in the third-party brain that justifies the very lenient punishment of ingroup 
member’s defective behavior. Such a justification process might include the search for 
mitigating reasons or personality characteristics that may be able to excuse the defective 
behavior. Thus, third-parties may try to understand the underlying reasons and intentions of 
ingroup member’s defective behavior and may consequently find a justification for the 
defective act. If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find increased activity in the 
mentalizing network of the brain, including the dorsomedial PFC (DMPFC) and the bilateral 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), because this kind of psychological processes - inferring 
temporary goals, intentions, desires as well as more enduring dispositions of others - have 
been strongly and consistently associated with this brain network (Gallagher and Frith 2003; 
Van Overwalle 2009). Finally, if the assumed mentalizing/justification process indeed occurs 
in the third-party brain, resulting in a reduced negative evaluation and associated reduced 
punishment behavior, we would expect the areas of the mentalizing network to be 
functionally connected with the punishment-related areas in the ventral and lateral PFC and/or 
dorsal caudatus. More precisely, if the mentalizing/justification network is indeed recruited to 
reduce the punishment of ingroup members’ defective behavior, we would expect to find 
evidence that the mentalizing network controls/downregulates the areas involved in 
punishment-related decision processes.  
  
Taken together, we hypothesize that the parochial nature of altruistic norm enforcement in the 
third-party brain is orchestrated by functionally connected brain areas involved in modulating 
the weight of economics self-interests (right LPFC), the motivational aspect of punishment 
(dorsal caudatus), negative and positive evaluation (OFG) and mentalizing (DMPFC, bilateral 
TPJ) processes. More precisely, we hypothesize that (1) the increased punishment of 
defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity and connectivity in brain 
areas known to play key and functionally distinct roles in punishment-related decision 
processes (lateral OFG, lateral PFC and caudatus). In sharp contrast, we expect that (2) the 
reduced punishment of defecting ingroup members is associated with increased activity and 
connectivity in key areas of the mentalizing network (DMPFC, TPJ). Finally, we hypothesize 
that (3) the mentalizing network might accomplish this reduced punishment of ingroup 
members by modulating/ down-regulating the activity in parts of the punishment network.  
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Results 
Behavioral results: Parochial punishment patterns 
Our main behavioral measure consists of each third-party's average punishment points, broken 
down into the three group constellations (BC, AC, ABC) and four behavior patterns based on 
player A’s and B’s decision to cooperate or defect (CC, CD, DC, DD). On the basis of these 
average punishment points, we calculated a two-way repeated measures of ANOVA with 
within-subject factor group constellation (BC, AC, ABC) and within-subject factor behavior 
(CC, CD, DC, DD). Results revealed significant main effects of group constellation (F(2,14) = 
5.36, p = 0.019, ETA2 = 0.43) and behavior  (F(3,13) = 10.34, p = 0.001, ETA2 = 0.71), as well 
as a significant interaction effect of group constellation × behavior  (F(6,10) = 4.20, p = 0.023, 
ETA2 = 0.72). As expected, these main and interaction effects demonstrated the following 
behavioral punishment pattern (see Fig.2). Cooperative behavioral decisions by player A 
(behavior patterns CC and CD) resulted in no impact of group membership on punishment 
behavior (paired t-test behavior CC: all p > 0.11; paired t-test behavior CD: all p > 0.09). This 
was due to the fact that, irrespective of whether player A was an outgroup or ingroup member, 
he was not punished for a cooperative behavioral decision (all simple t-tests versus 0: p > 
0.11). In sharp contrast, when player A defected and Player B cooperated (behavior pattern 
DC), group membership had a strong impact on punishment decisions. Outgroup members 
were punished much more severely for defecting than ingroup members (paired t-test: BC vs 
AC: p < 0.000, ETA2 = 0.63; BC vs ABC: p < 0.000, ETA2 = 0.66). This effect of group 
membership remained present when both players defected (behavioral pattern DD). The 
magnitude of the group effect was markedly reduced, however (paired t-test: BC vs AC: p = 
0.037, ETA2 = 0.26, BC vs ABC: p = 0.069, ETA2 = 0.20), indicated by increased p-values 
and strongly reduced effect size measures (ETA2). Finally, there was no significant difference 
in punishment behavior with respect to the two ingroup constellations (paired t-test behavior 
DC: AC vs ABC: p = 0.64; paired t-test behavior DD: AC vs ABC: p = 0.10). Taken together, 
the analysis of the punishment pattern revealed the expected parochial impact of group 
membership on altruistic norm enforcement, which is particularly pronounced in the DC 
condition when outgroup members defect against cooperating ingroup members.   
 
fMRI data: Outgroup effects   
In order to identify a functionally connected brain network which explains the strong impact 
of group membership on punishment behavior, we calculated in a first analysis the contrast 
outgroup (BC) minus ingroup (AC+ABC) constellations during the DC condition. The 
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resulting statistical parametric map (SPM, at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, 
Lieberman and Cunningham 2009) mainly revealed increased activation in a hypothesized 
network of brain regions which have been shown to play key and functionally separated roles 
in punishment-related decision processes (de Quervain, et al. 2004; Knoch, et al. 2007; 
Knoch, et al. 2006; Kringelbach 2005; Sanfey, et al. 2003; Spitzer, et al. 2007), including the 
right orbitofrontal gyrus (rOFG, BA 11/47, x = 33, y = 39, z = -9), the right lateral prefrontal 
cortex (rLPFC, BA 44/45, x = 57, y = 12, z = 15), and the right dorsal caudatus (x = 15, y = 
24, z = 9; Fig. 3, Supp. Table S1). Importantly, all these a priori regions of interests also 
survive small volume (SV) family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at p < 0.05 (see method 
section for details), except the dorsal caudatus which just falls short of the threshold with p = 
0.057.   
 
In order to corroborate the specificity of the findings in the rOFG, rLPFC, and right caudatus 
with respect to both lateralization pattern and condition effects, we conducted further analyses 
using either functional or spherical ROIs (see method section for details). First, we took a 
closer look at the lateralization pattern. We found no effect of group membership (BC vs AC, 
BC vs ABC, AC vs ABC) in the left hemisphere (paired t-tests in the DC condition: rOFG:  
all p > 0.23; rLPFC: all p > 0.88; right caudatus: all p > 0.55). Furthermore, these three brain 
regions were significantly more engaged in the right than in the left hemisphere in the DC 
condition (paired t-tests: OFG: p = 0.001; LPFC: p = 0.05; caudatus: p = 0.009), suggesting 
that the punishment-related activation in the OFG, LPFC, and caudatus are confined to the 
right hemisphere.  
 
If the rOFG, rLPFC, and right caudatus are indeed involved in the decision-making process 
which leads to an increased punishment of defective outgroup member, then these brain 
regions should not show a differential effect of group membership for player A's cooperative 
decisions (behavioral patterns CC, CD), when third-parties’ punishment behavior is virtually 
absent. Consistent with these assumption, the interaction effect of group constellation × 
behavior was significant in all these regions (all p < 0.01), and we found no effect of group 
membership (BC vs AC, BC vs ABC, AC vs ABC) on brain activity during these cooperative 
decision patterns (paired t-tests: rOFG: all p > 0.46; rLPFC: all p > 0.11, right caudatus: all p 
> 0.46). Furthermore, and in line with the markedly reduced differences in punishment 
behavior in the DD condition (see Fig. 2), all but one differential effect of group membership 
disappeared during the DD condition in these regions (all p > 0.23). The only exception 
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concerns the rLPFC which still shows enhanced activity (p = 0.002) in the outgroup 
constellation (BC) compared to one of the ingroup constellations (AC). 
 
So far, we have shown that the rOFG, rLPFC, and right caudatus show a very similar and 
highly specific activity pattern, which is restricted to the right hemisphere and only present 
when third-parties strongly punish outgroup members who defect against cooperating ingroup 
members. Such an activity pattern suggests, but does not yet provide evidence, that these 
regions actually form a functionally connected network orchestrating punishment behavior. In 
order to provide this evidence, we applied Physio-Physiological Interaction (PPI) analyses 
(Friston, et al. 1997), which elucidate the influence that one neuronal system exerts over 
another (termed effective connectivity, see method section for details). Findings revealed (at p 
< 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels) that activity in the rOFG positively modulates the 
effective connectivity between the right caudatus and rLPFC. In other words, we found that 
the higher the activity in the rOFG, the stronger the connectivity between right caudatus and 
rLPFC (Fig. 4A, for additional information and illustration please see Supp. Discussion S1 
and Supp. Fig. S3A) – a finding that provides evidence that these three brain regions actually 
form a functionally connected neural network orchestrating punishment behavior. This 
evidence was further corroborated by the observation (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 
voxels) that a neighboring part of the rLPFC (BA 45/46, x = 48, y = 21, z = 21) shows a 
positive connectivity pattern with the rOFG which depends on the punishment level. This 
means that the stronger third-parties punish defecting outgroup members in the DC condition, 
the stronger is the positive connectivity between the rOFG and the rLPFC (Fig. 4B).  
 
fMRI data: Ingroup effects 
Next, we reversed the contrast of the first analysis and wondered whether we find increased 
activity in the ingroup (AC+ABC) minus the outgroup (BC) constellations during the DC 
condition. Such a differential finding in the brain would be a first step in understanding the 
neural processes behind the phenomenon in which ingroup members incur much less severe 
punishment than outgroup members for the same defective behavior. We primarily found 
increased activity (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, Lieberman and 
Cunningham 2009) in three brain regions that are well-known to form a neural network 
involved in mentalizing processes (Gallagher and Frith 2003; Rilling, et al. 2004; Van 
Overwalle 2009), including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC, BA 9, x = 6, y = 54, z = 
30) and bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ, BA 39/40/22, left TPJ: x = -45, y = -60, z = 
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21; right TPJ: x = 57, y = -60, z = 30; Fig. 5, Supp. Table S1). All these a priori regions of 
interests survive small volume family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at p < 0.05 (see method 
section for details).  
 
In order to corroborate the specificity of the findings in the DMPFC and bilateral TPJ, we 
conducted further analysis using functional ROIs in the DMPFC and spherical ROIs (5mm 
radius) in the bilateral TPJ (see method section for details). If this mentalizing network is 
involved in reducing the punishment of defecting ingroup members, then we should not 
observe a differential group effect in these brain regions when third-parties face cooperative 
decisions by player A (CC, CD). Consistent with this hypothesis, the interaction effect of 
group constellation × behavior was significant in all these regions (all p < 0.01) and we found 
no evidence for an impact of group membership (BC vs AC, BC vs ABC, AC vs ABC) on the 
activity pattern in these brain regions during cooperative decisions (paired t-tests: DMPFC: all 
p > 0.24, left TPJ: all p > 0.32, right TPJ: all p > 0.41).  
 
Furthermore, we found that the functional connectivity (see method section) between two of 
the brain regions in this mentalizing network (DMPFC and left TPJ) depends on the third-
parties’ punishment levels of defecting ingroup members in the DC condition; the lower the 
third-parties’ punishment level, the higher the functional connectivity between these two brain 
regions (at p < 0.005, voxel extent: 12 voxels, Fig. 6). In other words, the stronger the 
interaction between these two regions of the mentalizing network, the less ingroup members 
are punished for defecting against cooperating outgroup members. This finding provides 
additional evidence that the mentalizing network is indeed recruited in order to reduce the 
punishment of defecting ingroup members.    
 
fMRI data: Functional connectivity analysis between the mentalizing 
network and the punishment network 
So far, we have identified a functionally connected punishment-network in our analyses 
consisting of the rOFG, rLPFC, and right caudatus. This network shows enhanced activity and 
connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punish outgroup members who defect against 
cooperating ingroup members. On the other hand, third-parties punish ingroup members far 
less for the same defective behavior, which is associated with increased activity and 
connectivity in main areas of the mentalizing network consisting of the DMPFC and bilateral 
TPJ. In a next analysis, we examined whether we find evidence in our data that these two 
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neuronal networks are functionally connected. We hypothesize that the mentalizing network 
might modulate the activity in parts of the punishment network, thus enabling third-parties to 
implement a reduced punishment behavior for defecting ingroup members. We focused our 
analysis in particular on the orbitofrontal gyrus because we argue that third-parties observing 
defecting ingroup members might start a justification process in the mentalizing network, 
which affects the evaluation process assumed to take place in the OFG (Kringelbach 2005; 
Liu, et al. 2007; Rangel, et al. 2008). In order to answer this question, we applied Physio-
Physiological Interaction (PPI) analyses (Friston, et al. 1997) using two areas of the 
mentalizing network as seed regions (DMPFC and left TPJ, see method section for details). 
Findings revealed (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels) in good agreements with 
our hypotheses that the activity in the left TPJ modulates the effective connectivity between 
the DMPFC and areas of the OFG and rLPFC. In particular, we found that the activity in the 
left TPJ positively modulates the functional connectivity between the DMPFC and medial 
areas of the OFG (mOFG; BA 10/11, x = -15, y = 45, z = -9) known to be involved in positive 
evaluation processes (Kringelbach 2005; Liu, et al. 2007; Rangel, et al. 2008). In stark 
contrast, activity in the left TPJ negatively modulates the functional connectivity between the 
DMPFC and lateral areas of the OFG (BA 10/11, left: x = -42, y = 54, z = -9, right: x = 24, y 
= 60, z = -6)   and rLPFC (BA 45/46, x = 54, y = 36, z = 15) (Fig. 7A/B; for additional 
information and illustration please see Supp. Discussion S1 and Supp. Fig. S3B-D). In other 
words, the higher the activity in the left TPJ, the stronger is the positive connectivity between 
DMPFC and mOFG, and the stronger is the negative connectivity between the DMPFC and 
lateral areas of the OFG and rLPFC. Notably, these negative connectivity effects are localized 
in neighboring and overlapping areas of the OFG and rLPFC shown to be involved in the 
punishment-related decision process in the DC condition (depicted in Fig. 3 and 4). Taken 
together, these findings support our hypothesis that the mentalizing network might control the 
activity in the punishment-network, in particular by affecting the evaluation of the ingroup 
member’s defective behavior. As a consequence, this reduced negative and/or increased 
positive evaluation might enable third-parties to implement a reduced punishment for the 
same defective behavior.   
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Discussion 
This study is the first to explore the neural networks involved in orchestrating the parochial 
nature of altruistic norm enforcement – a pervasive psychological phenomenon, which has 
shaped the human society in decisive ways (Bernhard, et al. 2006; Choi and Bowles 2007; 
Efferson, et al. 2008). Findings revealed that third-parties’ parochial punishment pattern is 
modulated by functionally connected neural networks previously shown to be involved in 
negative and positive evaluation processes (VLPFC, VMPFC, OFG), the weighting of 
economic self-interests (rLPFC), the appetitive and motivational component of punishment 
(right dorsal caudatus), and mentalizing processes (DMPFC, bilateral TPJ, for a summary of 
the neural findings please see Fig. 8). In the following, we will discuss the neural findings in 
detail.  
 
The increased punishment of outgroup members who defect against cooperating ingroup 
members was associated with increased activity in two hypothesized areas in the right lateral 
PFC and right dorsal caudatus, which have been shown to play important and functionally 
distinctive roles during the implementation of second-party punishment decisions where the 
norm violation directly affects the second-party punisher (in contrast to the third-party 
punisher). Existing studies (Knoch, et al. 2007; Knoch, et al. 2006; van 't Wout, et al. 2005) 
have demonstrated that disrupting the function of the control-related area of the right lateral 
PFC reduces subjects’ willingness to punish a norm violation committed intentionally, 
showing that the area is causally involved in costly punishment behavior. Crucially, the 
fairness judgment remained unaffected by the disruption of the PFC, suggesting that the 
subjects’ ability to identify and emotionally experience the norm violations were not 
compromised. These findings thus imply that the subjects are less able to implement costly 
punishment following disruption of the function of the right lateral PFC, due to the lack of 
prefrontal-mediated modulation of economic self-interests. On the other hand, the right dorsal 
striatum, a brain area strongly implicated in reward processing (Delgado, et al. 2003; 
Fliessbach, et al. 2007; Liu, et al. 2007; O'Doherty, et al. 2004), has also been demonstrated to 
be activated during second-party punishment decisions (de Quervain, et al. 2004), consistent 
with the view that this brain area motivates and reinforces the punishment act. Taken together, 
the increased activity of these two brain regions during both second and third-party norm 
enforcement processes indicates, as hypothesized, that the implementation of both second and 
third-party punishment decisions rely on similar neural circuitry. This interpretation is 
consistent with the findings of a study on third-party punishment judgments of fictive norm 
 15 
violations (Buckholtz, et al. 2008), where increased activity in the right lateral PFC was found 
when participants made judgments about the appropriate punishment for norm transgressions 
committed intentionally (rather than unintentionally).  
 
We hypothesized that parochial punishment patterns require the activation of further 
processes in the third-parties’ brains because it is otherwise difficult to explain why third 
parties punish the very same norm violation much more severely when an outgroup member 
(as opposed to an ingroup member) commits the transgression. In particular, we conjectured 
that two key processes must take place in third-party brains: First, a differential evaluation of 
outgroup and ingroup members’ defective behavior and, second, a mentalizing process which 
justifies this differential evaluation process. We predicted that these additional mental 
processes will yield differential activity and connectivity patterns across specific brain regions 
that have been shown to be involved in (1) evaluative processes and (2) in mentalizing 
processes in previous studies.  
 
The first prediction is supported by the observation of increased activity in the rOFG 
whenever third-parties severely punished outgroup members who defect against cooperating 
ingroup members and strongly reduced activity in the same brain region whenever ingroup 
members were punished far less for the very same norm violation. The lateral OFG, and in 
particular the rOFG, are brain areas shown to be associated with negative evaluation 
processes (Kringelbach 2005; Liu, et al. 2007; Rilling, et al. 2007; Seymour, et al. 2007; 
Spitzer, et al. 2007). The strongly increased activation of rOFG during the punishment of 
outgroup defectors is consistent with the view that third-parties evaluate outgroup members’ 
defective behavior more negatively than ingroup members’ defection. Moreover, we also find 
that the evaluation-related area in the rOFG mediates the effective connectivity between the 
two other areas in the rLPFC and rCaudatus that are activated whenever third-parties strongly 
punish outgroup defectors. These findings suggest that the stronger the negative evaluation of 
outgroup defection, and the stronger the associated activation of rOFG, the stronger the 
functional connectivity between the two areas known to be involved in implementing the 
punishment behavior. In other words, a strong negative evaluation of outgroup members’ 
defective behavior might trigger a cascade of functionally connected neural processes which 
enable third-parties to implement a more costly punishment by down-weighting their own 
economic self-interest and motivating the punishment act. Further evidence for this 
interpretation is provided by the observation that the strength of punishment of defecting 
 16 
outgroup members depends on the functional connectivity between the rOFG and rLPFC. The 
stronger these areas are functionally connected, the stronger outgroup members are punished 
for committing a norm violation against cooperating ingroup members.  
 
The data also supports our second prediction that the much lower punishment of ingroup 
members is associated with activation of brain regions associated with mentalizing processes 
because we find increased activity in the DMPFC and bilateral TPJ when the third-parties 
face an ingroup defector (compared to an outgroup defector). If third-parties attempt to 
understand the intentions or goals behind ingroup members’ defective behavior because they 
try to find mitigating reasons that provide an excuse for ingroup defectors, we would expect 
the activation of DMPFC and TPJ because these two brain regions are key components in the 
mentalizing network known to be involved in inferring temporary goals, intentions, desires, as 
well as more enduring dispositions of others (Gallagher and Frith 2003; Hampton, et al. 2008; 
Mitchell, et al. 2005; Steinbeis and Koelsch 2009; Van Overwalle 2009). Our connectivity 
findings both within the mentalizing network and between the mentalizing and the 
punishment network corroborate the hypothesis that the mentalizing regions modulate 
punishment behavior. First, the functional connectivity of two areas of the mentalizing 
network (DMPFC and left TPJ) depends on third-parties' punishment decisions. More 
precisely, the less third parties punish ingroup defectors, the stronger is the functional 
connectivity between these two key areas of the mentalizing network. Second, the same two 
areas of the mentalizing network (DMPFC and left TPJ) show a connectivity pattern with 
areas of the punishment network, suggesting that mentalizing-related activity reduces the 
punishment behavior by modulating the activity in evaluation-related (rOFG, mOFG) and 
control-related areas of the lateral PFC (rLPFC). More precisely, the neural data suggest that 
the left TPJ negatively modulates the effective connectivity between the DMPFC and lateral 
areas of the PFC (rOFG, rLPFC), whereas the left TPJ positively modulates the effective 
connectivity between the DMPFC and medial areas of the OFG known to be involved in 
positive evaluation processes (Hare, et al. 2009; Kringelbach 2005). Thus, the lower 
punishment of ingroup members' defective behavior may have been implemented via the 
modulatory role of left TPJ on evaluation related prefrontal areas such as mOFG and rOFG.  
 
The lack of mentalizing-related brain activity and the associated increased punishment in 
situations when outgroup members commit the norm transgression are particularly interesting 
in light of a recent publication (Harris and Fiske 2006). In this study, participants saw images 
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of different outgroups which varied in dimensions of competence (high or low) and warmth 
(high = friend, low = foe). Crucially, the mentalizing network only failed to be activated if 
participants faced extreme outgroups, i.e. people who were both low in competence and low 
in warmth (e.g. homeless people, drug addicts). The authors interpreted this lack of 
mentalizing-related activity as an indication that extreme outgroups may not be perceived as 
fully human, may even be dehumanized by denying characteristics to them that are uniquely 
human (representing them as animal-like) and those that constitute human nature 
(representing them as objects or automata) (Allport 1954; Haslam 2006). This lack of activity 
in areas of the mentalizing network in both studies permits the speculation that the defecting 
outgroup members of our paradigm are treated similarly to the extreme outgroup members in 
the study by Harris and colleagues. In this context, it is important to remember that our 
outgroup does not consists of extreme outgroup members such as homeless people or drug 
addicts. Instead, the characteristics of the outgroup and ingroup members are identical; all are 
officer candidates in the Swiss army, there are no significant differences in education or age, 
and the assignment to the different platoons/groups was random. Thus, the finding that the 
extreme outgroups (e.g. homeless people and drug addicts) and the defecting outgroup 
members of our study evoke a similar activity pattern in the mentalizing network (i.e. no 
increased activity compared to baseline) further illustrates the strong impact of parochial 
altruism on neural activations. 
 
Finally, we would like to point out that some of our interpretations (e.g. negative evaluations 
in the rOFG and mentalizing in the DMPFC and bilateral TPJ) rely on assumptions about 
specific cognitive functions subserved by these brain regions in the type of behavioral 
paradigm we implemented. If we had complemented our neuroimaging and behavioral 
punishment data with subjective ratings or judgments, these assumptions could have been 
further strengthened. For example, if we had asked subjects about their mentalizing processes, 
we would have been able to clarify more precisely whether the increased activity in the 
mentalizing network indicates an overabundance of mentalizing leading to increased 
justification for in-group members or rather a deficit in mentalizing for outgroup members 
leading to decreased justification. However, despite this limitation of the study, we would like 
to emphasize that no assumptions about specific cognitive functions subserved by these brain 
regions are necessary to render the results of our paper interesting and important because no 
other paper has yet identified the activity and connectivity patterns associated with parochial 
norm enforcement (please check summary of the results below).  
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Summing up, this study is the first to reveal the neural circuitry of the impact of parochial 
altruism on social norm enforcement. In order to study this prevalent psychological 
phenomenon, we applied a third-party punishment paradigm with manipulation of group 
membership using real social groups, the involvement of real monetary stakes, and the 
requirement to curb immediate self-interests in order to enforce social norms. We found (1) 
that third-parties’ higher punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with 
increased activity and connectivity in a functionally connected neural network involved in 
punishment-related decision processes, including the rOFG, rLPFC, and right dorsal caudatus. 
Furthermore, (2) the functional connectivity between two areas of this punishment network 
predicts third-parties’ punishment of defecting outgroup members. More precisely, the 
stronger the rOFG and rLPFC are functionally connected, the more severely outgroup 
members are punished for defecting cooperating ingroup members. In sharp contrast, (3) the 
lower punishment of defecting ingroup members is associated with increased activity in brain 
areas well-known to be involved in mentalizing processes (including the DMPFC and 
bilateral TPJ), as if third-parties tried to understand the underlying intentions and goals behind 
ingroup members’ defective behavior. The conjecture that the mentalizing network modulates 
punishment is corroborated by the finding that (4) the functional connectivity between two 
areas of this mentalizing network (DMPFC and left TPJ) is related to the punishment of 
ingroup defectors in a particular way: the stronger the connectivity between these two areas, 
the less third-parties punish ingroup defectors. Finally, (5) the functional connectivity 
between areas of the mentalizing (DMPFC and left TPJ) and punishment network suggests 
that the reduction in punishment is associated with the modulation of the neural activity in the 
right orbitofrontal gyrus and right lateral prefrontal cortex, i.e. in the same areas showing 
enhanced activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punished defecting 
outgroup members. The neural findings of this study thus provide evidence for the view that 
humans have developed elaborate neural circuitry for social cognition that modulates the 
parochial nature of altruistic norm enforcement – a prevalent psychological phenomenon that 
has shaped humans’ cooperative, altruistic, and punishment-related behavior in decisive ways.  
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Methods 
Subjects 
A total of 16 healthy, right-handed male subjects (mean age ± s.d., 24.5 ± 2.2, max: 27, min: 
20) participated in the fMRI-study. None of the participants had to be excluded from the 
analyses. All subjects were free of chronic diseases, mental disorders, medication, and drug or 
alcohol abuse. The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
principles and approved by the institutional ethics committee. All subjects gave written, 
informed consent and were informed of their right to discontinue participation at any time. 
 
Group manipulation: Real social groups 
All 16 subjects who took part in the fMRI experiment were completing a four-week phase of 
officer training in the Swiss army at the time of the experiment. This training course brings 
officer candidates from all branches of service together to the same location in order to 
promote exchanges of perspective among different branches of service. Training involves 
mainly coursework on principles of security, combat in large military units, logistics, and 
leadership. Important for the investigation of the impact of group membership on social norm 
enforcement, the officer candidates are randomly assigned to platoons (groups) at the 
beginning of the training course. This random assignment mechanism is ideal for the 
experimental paradigm in several ways (for details see Goette, et al. 2006). First, trainees 
know that platoon composition is identical and that none of the officers could choose which 
platoon to join. Statistical tests reveal no significant differences in platoon composition with 
respect to branch of service, education, or age. Second, there is no competition between the 
groups for evaluations or other resources. Third, despite random assignment to platoons, 
social ties form very quickly. Officers indicated in a questionnaire that they spent 
significantly more time off duty with members of their own platoon. Thus, the officer 
candidates interact almost exclusively with members of their own platoon, both during on-
duty and off-duty time.  
 
Design 
We applied a third-party punishment paradigm (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004b) with group 
manipulation (Bernhard, et al. 2006; Goette, et al. 2006) consisting of two decision stages, 
one conducted in the training course of the Swiss army and one conducted in the fMRI 
scanner. The subjects knew in all stages of the experiment that there were no repeated 
interactions and that all interactions were conducted in complete anonymity. During the first 
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decision stage conducted in the training course of the Swiss army, the officer candidates 
played (in the role of player A and B) a simultaneous Prisoners’ Dilemma game, where they 
could decide either to cooperate or defect. Thus, 4 behavioral patterns are possible: player A 
and B cooperate (CC), player A and B defect (DD), player A cooperate and player B defects 
(CD), and player A defects and player B cooperates (DC). Player A and B knew that other 
officer candidates from the same training course would be confronted with their decisions, 
and that they would receive the opportunity to judge their behavior in the role of a third-party 
(player C) by assigning deduction/punishment points. In total, 16 officer candidates were 
invited to take part in this second decision stage conducted in the fMRI-scanner, where they 
were confronted with 30 decisions stemming from different players A and B. At the beginning 
of each punishment trial, they received an endowment of 10 points which they could either 
keep or use to punish player A. 1 point assigned for punishment reduced the punished player's 
income by 3 points. Points not used for punishment were exchanged into real money and paid 
to player C at the end of the experiment (for details on exchange rate please see below). 
Player C was always informed about the group affiliation of player A and B, that is whether 
the players were from his own or another platoon (in-/outgroup manipulation). There are 3 
group constellations in the experiment; two ingroup constellations (ABC, AC), where player 
A (who can be punished by C) is from his own platoon and one outgroup constellation (BC), 
where player A (who can be punished by C) is from another platoon. 
 
Subjects were paid according to their decisions (player A, B, and C) and the decisions of their 
interaction partners (player A and B). While players A and B received their money per mail 
shortly after the scanning session was conducted, player C was immediately paid at the end of 
the scanning session. The exchange rate was as follows: 10 points = 2 Swiss Francs, that is 
about $ 2.  
 
Subjects read written instructions describing the details of the paradigm, including the payoff 
rules, prior to both decision stages in the Swiss army training course and in the fMRI scanner. 
After the subjects had read the instructions, we checked whether they understood the payoff 
rules and the treatment conditions by means of several hypothetical questions. All subjects 
answered the control questions correctly.  
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Procedure in the scanner 
The computer screens that the third-parties needed to see during the punishment trials (see 
Fig.1 for an example) were presented with a video projector onto a translucent screen that 
subjects viewed inside the scanner via a mirror. On these judgment screens, players A and B 
were represented by schematic pictures of two humans whose coloring in grey or black 
indicated the players' group affiliation. In half of the subjects, grey indicated an ingroup 
member and black an outgroup member, while the coloring for ingroup and outgroup 
members was reversed for the other half of the subjects. In addition to the coloring, the 
players' group affiliation was depicted verbally (your group/other group). Finally, the players' 
behavior, that is whether these players defected (kept the points) or cooperated (transferred 
the points) was also depicted verbally. After this information on group affiliation and 
behavior was presented for 4 seconds, 4 buttons representing the four punishment options 
were presented on the same screen, indicating that the subjects could now implement their 
punishment decisions, by means of a 4-button input device. In half of the subjects, these 
punishment options were presented with a scale ranging from 0 to 9 deduction points (0/3/6/9) 
and in the other half of subjects, the punishment scale was reversed (9/6/3/0). On average, 
punishment decisions were implemented 6.92 seconds (standard error: 0.36) after the onset of 
the judgment screen. After pressing the button, the judgment decision remained on the screen 
for another two seconds and was then replaced by a fixation cross, which separated the 
punishment trials by 14 seconds.  
 
The software package z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), a program for conducting behavioral 
experiments in combination with neuroimaging, was used for presenting screens and for 
collecting behavioral and timing data.  
 
Behavioral analyses  
In order to analyze third-parties’ punishment levels, we first calculated an average punishment 
level for each condition (3 group constellations × 4 behavioral patterns). We then used the 
statistical software package SPSS 15 for PC (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) for the different 
analyses of the behavioral data. Please see results section for details about the statistical tests 
conducted, including paired t-tests, simple t-tests, and repeated measures ANOVA with 
within-subjects factor group constellation (BC, AC, ABC) and behavioral patterns (CC, CD, 
DC, DD). Results were considered significant at the level of p < 0.05 (two-tailed). In case of a 
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significant multivariate effects, post hoc paired t-tests were computed using the Bonferroni 
correction according to Holm (Holm 1979). As effect size measure ETA2 is reported.  
 
fMRI analyses: Image acquisition  
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole body MR Scanner (Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips SENSE head 
coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T1–weighted transversal images (0.75 mm 
slice thickness). For functional imaging, a total of 280 volumes were obtained using a 
SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE;  (Pruessmann, et al. 1999)) T2*-weighted echo-planar 
imaging sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. 40 axial slices were acquired covering 
the whole brain with a slice thickness of 3mm; no inter-slice gap; interleaved acquisition; TR 
= 3000 ms; TE = 35ms; flip angle = 77°, field of view = 220mm; matrix size = 128 × 128. We 
used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at 30° to the AC-PC line in order to optimize 
functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes.  
 
fMRI analyses: Preprocessing 
For the preprocessing and statistical analyses, the statistical parametric mapping software 
package (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) implemented 
in Matlab (Version 7) were used. For analysis, all images were realigned to the first volume, 
corrected for motion artifacts and time of acquisition within a TR, normalized (3 × 3 × 3 
mm3) into standard stereotaxic space (template provided by the Montreal Neurological 
Institute), and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A 
band-pass filter composed of a discrete cosine-basis function with a cut-off period of 128 
seconds for the high-pass filter was applied. In order to increase signal to noise ratio, global 
intensity changes were minimized by scaling each image to the grand mean.  
 
fMRI analyses: General linear model (GLM) 
We performed random-effects analyses on the functional data for the punishment period. For 
that purpose, we defined a general linear model (GLM) with the following regressors of 
interests: 3 group constellations (BC, AC, ABC) × 4 behavioral patterns (CC, CD, DC, DD). 
The length of each of these regressors was individually modeled from the onset of the 
punishment trials until the subject’s button press. All regressors were convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The 6 scan-to-scan motion parameters 
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produced during realignment were included as additional regressors in the SPM analysis to 
account for residual effects of scan to scan motion.  
 
For second-level random effects analysis, the single-subject Beta-estimates were entered into 
a repeated-measures of ANOVA with within-subject factor group constellations (BC, AC, 
ABC) and within-subject factor behavioral patterns (CC, CD, DC, DD). Due to the fact that 
the study was specifically designed to reveal the parochial nature of altruistic norm 
enforcement, we focused on the DC trials in our analyses of the brain activity pattern, where 
we observed, as expected, the strongest parochial punishment pattern. All other behavioral 
trials (CC, CD, DD) were primarily used in the analyses to demonstrate the specificity of the 
parochial activity pattern during the DC condition.  
 
In order to reveal the neural underpinnings of the parochial punishment pattern, we focused 
on the following two brain contrast: 
  DC trials only: Outgroup (BC) minus Ingroup (AC+ABC) weighted 
 DC trials only: Ingroup (AC + ABC) weighted minus Outgroup (BC) 
The first brain contrast allowed us to test our hypothesis that the increased punishment of 
defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity in brain areas known to play 
key and functionally distinct roles in punishment-related decision processes (lateral OFG, 
lateral PFC, and caudatus). The second brain contrast allowed us to test our hypothesis that 
the reduced punishment of defecting ingroup members is associated with increased activity in 
key areas of the mentalizing network (DMPFC, TPJ): 
 
In order to increase the specificity of the findings during these DC trials only contrasts, we 
exclusively masked them at p < 0.05 with the same group constellation contrast (Outgroup 
minus Ingroup and vice versa, respectively), but calculated with trials where player A (whom 
C can punish) shows a cooperative behavioral pattern (CC, CD). This masking procedure 
excludes all regions (at p < 0.05) that show an unspecific main effect of group membership. In 
other words, we report in these DC trials only contrasts brain areas, which are differentially 
activated solely when third-parties demonstrate a highly distinctive parochial punishment 
pattern.  
 
Although not the main aim of the current manuscript, we calculated the following two 
additional contrasts in order to reveal the brain areas demonstrating a main effect of group 
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membership, including those trials where no (CC, CD) or only a marginal (DD) parochial 
punishment pattern was expected and found (see supporting analysis S1): 
 All behavioral trials: Outgroup (BC) minus Ingroup (AC+ABC)weighted 
 All behavioral trials: Ingroup (AC + ABC) weighted minus Outgroup (BC) 
 
fMRI-Analyses: Statistical inferences 
We report results in a priori regions of interests [previously defined in neuroimaging studies 
on punishment (Buckholtz, et al. 2008; de Quervain, et al. 2004; Knoch, et al. 2006; Sanfey, 
et al. 2003; Spitzer, et al. 2007; Strobel, et al. 2011) and mentalizing (Van Overwalle 2009)]: 
OFG, right lateral PFC, caudatus, DMPFC, TPJ where activations are significant at p < 0.005 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons with an extent threshold of 10 voxels (Lieberman and 
Cunningham 2009), and survive small volume corrections (SVC) for multiple comparisons 
(or family-wise error [FWE] corrections across the whole brain). The SVC procedure, as 
implemented in SPM5 using the FWE correction procedure (p < 0.05), allows results to be 
corrected for multiple non-independent comparisons with a defined region of interest. For the 
SVC procedure, we used anatomical masks (lateral OFG, caudatus) obtained from the WFU 
PickAtlas toolbox (Maldjian, et al. 2003), and 20 mm spheres centered on coordinates derived 
from previous work. For the areas of the mentalizing network, we used a recently published 
meta-analysis (Van Overwalle 2009) on social cognition to define the peaks in the lTPJ (x = -
49, y = -58, z = 22) , rTPJ (x = 53, y = -54, z = 22) and DMPFC (x = -3, y = 48, z = 30), 
which consisted of the average coordinates of those mentalizing tasks (including goal, 
intention and trait inferences, and morality judgments) consistently activating these brain 
areas. For the punishment-related activated in the rLPFC, we averaged the peak coordinates of 
a second-party norm enforcement study (x = 40, y = 36, z = 22) (Sanfey, et al. 2003) where 
disruption by rTMS (Knoch, et al. 2006) or tDCS (Knoch, et al. 2007) reduces subject’s 
ability to control their economic self-interest. Activations in other regions were only 
considered significant if they survived whole-brain FWE correction for multiple comparisons 
at p < 0.05 [in line with established procedures (Frackowiak, et al. 2004)], but are reported for 
completeness at a threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Reported 
voxels conform to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinate space. The right side of 
the brain is displayed on the right side in our illustrations.   
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fMRI-analyses: ROI analyses 
In order to illustrate the specificity of the findings both with regard to group constellations 
(BC, AC, ABC), behavioral patterns (CC, CD, DC, DD), and lateralization effects, we created 
either functional or spherical ROIs using the MarsBaR software. Functional ROIs 
encompassed all voxels that were significantly (p < 0.005) activated in the corresponding 
contrast analyses, whereas spherical ROIs consisted of a 5 mm sphere around the peak of 
activity. The rule for applying spherical or functional ROI’s was as follows: For regions with 
a voxel extent of 20 or more voxels (at p < 0.005), we created spherical ROIs (bilateral 
temporo-parietal-junction), whereas we created functional ROIs for all other regions with a 
voxel extent between 10 and 20 voxels (rOFG, rLPFC, rCaudatus, DMPFC). Please note that 
the conducted statistical analyses (based on extracted Beta-estimates) do not significantly 
change if we apply the same ROI type for all regions, either functional or spherical.  
 
In order to corroborate the ROI analyses described above, additional region of interests 
analyses were performed on anatomical or spherical ROIs defined by prior studies. The 
advantage of this approach is that the definition of ROIs is independent of the findings in the 
present study and thus less biased. To conduct these ROI analyses, we applied the same 
independent ROIs as we had used for the small volume family-wise-error corrections 
(described in detail above, please see statistical inference). Importantly, the findings of the 
two ROI-analyses do not differ. In particular, the specificity of the parochial activity pattern 
reported for the DC condition was corroborated, since there was no impact of group 
membership on these regions during cooperative behavioral decisions (all p > 0.25).     
 
fMRI-analyses: Physio-Physiological Interaction analyses 
In order to reveal the functional connectivity between brain areas orchestrating the parochial 
nature of altruistic norm enforcement, we applied Physio-Physiological Interaction (PPI) 
analyses (Friston, et al. 1997), which elucidate the influence that one neuronal system exerts 
over another (termed effective connectivity). For that purpose, we extracted mean-corrected 
and high-pass filtered time series of the rOFG, the rCaudatus, the DMPFC, and the left TPJ 
from a 5 mm spherical ROI around the peak of activation derived from the DC trials only 
contrasts. Once these time series were obtained for each subject, the interaction term (referred 
to as “PPI regressor”) was computed as the vector resulting from the element-by-element 
product of two mean corrected time series. Based on our hypotheses and the findings of the 
GLM analyses, we created the following two interaction terms: interaction term of the time 
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series of rOFG and rCaudatus as well as of the time series of left TPJ and DMPFC. We used 
these two interaction terms as regressors of interests in two independent first level analyses, 
with the two single time series included as regressors of non-interests (either rOFG and 
rCaudatus or DMPFC and left TPJ). Each subject’s Beta-estimates of the two PPI regressors 
were then taken to random-effects group analyses and entered into two one-sample t-tests. We 
were particularly interested in answering the following two questions in our analyses of these 
two PPI-regressors: First, do we find evidence in our data that the evaluation-related area of 
the rOFG positively modulates the connectivity between the rCaudatus and rLPFC, two areas 
thought to be critically involved in implementing punishment-related decision processes? 
Second, do we find evidence that one part of the mentalizing network in the left TPJ 
negatively modulates the connectivity between the other part of the mentalizing network in 
the DMPFC and the areas involved in punishment-related decision processes, including the 
rOFG, rLPFC, and the rCaudatus?    
 
Finally, we examined whether differences in functional connectivity within areas of the 
mentalizing and punishment network, respectively, can explain the individual differences in 
punishment behavior during the DC condition. For that purpose, we entered the Beta-
estimates from the single time-course regressors of the rOFG and DMPFC (included as 
regressor of non-interests in the PPI analyses described above) into two multiple regression 
analyses. These regression analyses included the individual punishment levels from the DC 
condition as covariates. More precisely, we used third-parties’ individual punishment level of 
defecting outgroup members to search for areas within the punishment network whose 
connectivity with the rOFG depends on the individual punishment level. In contrast, we used 
third-parties’ individual punishment levels of defecting ingroup members to search for areas 
within the mentalizing network, where the connectivity with the DMPFC depends on the 
individual punishment level. In the former case, we expected a positive correlation within the 
punishment network, whereas we expected a negative correlation within the mentalizing 
network in the latter case.    
 
Due to strong a priori hypotheses, the significant thresholds for all connectivity analyses were 
set at p < 0.005 with a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels (Lieberman and Cunningham 
2009). For illustrative purposes, we created functional ROIs using the MarsBaR software by 
selecting all voxels that were significantly activated at p < 0.005 together with a cluster extent 
threshold of 10 voxels in the corresponding analyses.  
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Figures 1-8 
Figure 1: Design and decision screen.  
 
Figure 1: Design and decision screen. (A) Depicted is the third-party punishment paradigm 
with group manipulation (ingroup/outgroup). During stage 1, which took place in the training 
course of the Swiss army, player A and player B (officer candidates) played a simultaneous 
Prisoners’ Dilemma Game (PD), in which they were free to decide whether to cooperate 
(transfer the points) or to defect (keep the points). During stage 2, which took place in the 
fMRI-scanner, some of the officer candidates in the role of a third-party (player C) were 
confronted with the decisions of player A and B and had the opportunity to assign (costly) 
punishment points to one of the players. For that purpose, player C was endowed with 10 
points for each judgment trial. 1 point assigned for punishment reduced the income of the 
punished player by 3 points. Note that we recoded all of player C's decisions in such a way 
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that A always refers to the player that C can punish, whereas B always refers to the player that 
C cannot punish. Crucially, player A (whom C could punish) was either from the same 
group/platoon as player C, as in the group constellations ABC (in green color) and AC (in 
blue color), or was from a different group/platoon as in the group constellation BC (in red 
color). Thus, ABC and AC are ingroup constellations, whereas BC is an outgroup 
constellation. (B) Depicted is an example for a decision screen third-parties saw during the 
scanning session. In this particular case, third-parties were confronted with the outgroup 
constellation BC and an outgroup member who defected against a cooperating ingroup 
member. The group affiliation of player A and B was indicated both verbally (your 
group/other group) and schematically (in black or grey color). Please note that we reversed 
the color for the schematic depiction of ingroup and outgroup members and the punishment 
scale (9 6 3 0 instead of 0 3 6 9) for half of the subjects. 
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Figure 2: Punishment behavior. 
 
Figure 2: Punishment behavior. Analyses of third-parties’ punishment behavior of player A 
revealed, as expected, a strong impact of group membership on punishment behavior when 
player A defected and player B cooperated (DC), a weak effect when both players defected 
(DD), and no significant impact of group membership when player A cooperated (CC, CD). 
Thus, third-parties’ punishment behavior revealed the expected parochial pattern, qualified by 
increased punishment of outgroup members and reduced punishment of ingroup members for 
the same defective behavior.   
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Figure 3: Outgroup effects: Punishment network.  
 
Figure 3: Outgroup effects: Punishment network. Depicted is the increased activation in 
the brain (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, activity in all regions survives small 
volume family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at p < 0.05, except the dorsal caudatus which 
just falls short of the threshold with p = 0.057, see methods section for details) contrasting the 
outgroup (BC) minus the ingroup (AC+ABC) constellations, when player A defected and 
player B cooperated (behavioral pattern DC). Consistent with the increased punishment 
pattern in the outgroup condition (BC), increased activity was mainly found in brain areas 
involved in punishment-related decision processes, including (A) right orbitofrontal gyrus 
(BA 11/47, x = 33, y = 39, z = -9), (B) right lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 44/45, x = 57, y = 
12, z = 15) , and (C) right dorsal caudatus (x = 15, y = 24, z = 9). Bar plots representing 
contrast estimates (in/outgroup vs baseline) of functional ROIs (see method section for 
details) revealed in accordance with the similar punishment pattern that the two ingroup 
constellations (AC, ABC) show a highly similar activity pattern (p > 0.25 for all paired t-tests 
between the two ingroup constellations). Asterisks denote increased activity compared to 
baseline at p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), p < 0.005 (***) or p < 0.001 (****). Please see 
supporting Figure S1 for event-related BOLD time courses of the depicted brain regions.     
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Figure 4: Connectivity analyses within the punishment network.  
 
 
Figure 4: Connectivity analyses within the punishment network. (A) Physio-Physiological 
Interaction (PPI) analyses using the rOFG and right caudatus as seed regions revealed 
evidence (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels) that the rOFG positively modulates 
the functional connectivity between right caudatus and rLPFC – notably in the same area of 
the rLPFC showing increased activity when third-parties strongly punish outgroup members 
who defect against cooperating ingroup members (the same activation as illustrated in Fig. 
3B). These highly specific connectivity and activity patterns provide evidence for a 
functionally connected neural network orchestrating punishment behavior. Color coding: 
connectivity effect depicted in red, activation level effect depicted in yellow, overlap depicted 
in orange. (B) Connectivity analyses using the rOFG as seed region revealed (at p < 0.005, 
voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, in violet color) that the functional connectivity between the 
rOFG and rLPFC depends on third-parties’ punishment level, that is the higher third-parties 
punish defecting outgroup members in the DC condition, the stronger is the functional 
connectivity between these two regions. The scatter plot depicts this effect using a functional 
ROI of the rLPFC (BA 45/46, x = 48, y = 21, z = 21). In order to visualize the spatial 
proximity of all activation and connectivity effects in the rLPFC, the same activity and 
connectivity patterns described in (A) are also depicted here in (B) in the same colors. For 
display purposes, all activation and connectivity patterns in (A) and (B) are depicted at p < 
0.01.  
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Figure 5: Ingroup effects: Mentalizing network.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Ingroup effects: Mentalizing network. Depicted is the increased activation in the 
brain (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels; activity in all regions survives small 
volume family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at p < 0.05, see methods section for details) 
contrasting the ingroup (AC+ABC) minus the outgroup (BC) constellations, when player A 
defected and player B cooperated (behavioral pattern DC).  Increased activity was mainly 
found in brain areas involved in mentalizing processes, including (A) dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (DMPFC; BA 9, x = 6, y = 54, z = 30), (B) left temporo-parietal junction (lTPJ, BA 
39/40/22, x = -45, y = -60, z = 21) and (C) right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ, BA 39/40, x 
= 57, y = -60, z = 30). Bar plots (color coding as in Fig. 3, red = outgroup BC, blue = ingroup 
AC, green = ingroup ABC) representing contrast estimates (in/outgroup vs baseline) of 
functional or spherical ROIs (see method section for details) revealed in accordance with the 
similar punishment pattern that the two ingroup constellations (AC, ABC) show a highly 
similar activity pattern (p > 0.25 for all paired t-tests between the two ingroup constellations). 
Asterisks denote increased activity compared to baseline at p < 0.05 (*), p < 0.01 (**), p < 
0.005 (***) or p < 0.001 (****). Please see supporting Figure S2 for event-related BOLD 
time courses of the depicted brain regions.       
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 Figure 6: Connectivity analyses within the mentalizing network.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Connectivity analyses within the mentalizing network. (A) Connectivity 
analyses using the DMPFC as seed region revealed (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold = 10 
voxels) that the functional connectivity between the DMPFC and lTPJ depends on third-
parties’ punishment level, that is the less third-parties punish defecting ingroup members in 
the DC condition, the stronger is the functional connectivity between these two regions. This 
finding provides additional evidence that the mentalizing network is recruited in order to 
reduce the punishment of defecting ingroup members. Color coding: connectivity effect 
depicted in red, activation level effect depicted in yellow (the same activation as depicted in 
Fig. 5B), overlap depicted in orange. (B) The scatter plot visualizes the effect explained in (A) 
using a functional ROI of the lTPJ (x = -57, y = -54, z = 24).  
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Figure 7: Connectivity analyses between the mentalizing-network and 
punishment-network. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Connectivity analyses between the mentalizing-network and punishment-
network. We applied Physio-Physiological Interaction (PPI) analyses using the DMPFC and 
lTPJ as seed regions in order to reveal the effective connectivity between the two networks 
shown to orchestrate the parochial nature of altruistic norm enforcement. Findings revealed 
evidence (at p < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels) that the lTPJ modulates the 
effective connectivity between the DMPFC and (A) the evaluation system in the lateral (BA 
10/11, left: x = -42, y = 54, z = -9; right: x = 24, y = 60, z = -6, depicted in blue) and medial 
OFG (BA 10/11, x = -15, y = 45, z = -9, depicted in red)  as well as (B) the cognitive control 
system in the rLPFC  (BA 45/46, x = 54, y = 36, z = 15, depicted in blue). In detail, medial 
areas of the OFG (depicted in red) show an enhanced positive connectivity with the DMPFC 
whenever the lTPJ is strongly activated. In sharp contrast, lateral areas of the OFG and the 
rLPFC (depicted in blue) show an enhanced negative connectivity with the DMPFC whenever 
the lTPJ is strongly activated. These highly distinctive connectivity effects in medial and 
lateral areas of the OFG support our hypothesis that a justification process in the mentalizing 
network might change the evaluation of ingroup members’ defective behavior (making it less 
negative and/or more positive). Notably, the negative connectivity effects are localized in 
neighboring and overlapping areas of the punishment-network depicted in Fig. 3 and 4. In 
order to visualize this spatial proximity, the same activity (depicted in yellow) and positive 
connectivity patterns (depicted in red and violet in the zoom view of Fig. 7B) are shown here. 
We in particularly want to point out (see zoom view in Fig. 7B) that the negative connectivity 
effect in the rLPFC (in blue) is localized in the same area showing an enhanced positive 
connectivity with the rOFG, whenever third-parties strongly punish defecting outgroup 
members (depicted in violet, overlap depicted in dark violet). For display purposes all 
activation and connectivity patterns in (A) and (B) are depicted at p < 0.01, except for the 
zoom view in (A) on which the patterns are depicted at p < 0.05.   
 36 
Figure 8: Summary.  
 
 
Figure 8: Summary. The analysis of the neural underpinnings of the parochial nature of 
altruistic norm enforcement revealed the following activity and connectivity pattern. First, the 
increased punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity in 
a functionally connected network of brain areas involved in punishment-related decision 
processes (red circles and red lines with arrows). Second, the stronger the connectivity within 
areas of this punishment network, the stronger defecting outgroup members are punished 
(violet lines with arrows). Third, the reduced punishment of ingroup members’ defective 
behavior is associated with increased activity in the mentalizing network of the brain, 
suggesting that third-parties try to understand and justify ingroup members’ defective 
behavior (blue circles). Fourth, the stronger the connectivity within areas of this mentalizing 
network, the less third-parties punish defecting ingroup members (orange lines with arrows). 
Fifth, the analysis of connectivity between the punishment and mentalizing/justification 
network suggests that the mentalizing/justification process reduces the punishment behavior 
by modulating the activity in areas of the punishment network associated with negative 
evaluation processes (rOFC) and the assignment of an appropriate punishment level via the 
weighting of economic-self-interests (rLPFC, blue lines with arrows).  
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